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Does experimental philosophy have a role to play in Carnapian 
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Abstract. Shepherd and Justus argue that experimental philosophy has an important role to play in the method of 
Carnapian explication, facilitating the preparatory stage during which the concept to be explicated is clarified. I 
raise concerns about their specific proposal, before sketching an alternative. In particular, I suggest that 
experimental philosophy can directly aid the construction of fruitful concepts. This provides a clear practical role 
for experimental philosophy, both within the sciences and theoretical inquiry more generally. In this respect, 
experimental philosophy may rightly be construed as one aspect of applied philosophy. 
1. Introduction 
Joshua Shepherd and James Justus (2015) have recently argued that experimental philosophy can be 
incorporated, perhaps surprisingly, into Carnap’s (1950) method of explication:1 they propose that 
experimental philosophy play a clarificatory role in the initial preparatory stage of explication. Shepherd 
and Justus take themselves to have highlighted “a compelling new positive program for [experimental 
philosophy]” (2015: 391).  
 I endorse the authors’ search for new, important, positive work for experimental philosophy. 
And I agree that such work might be found in connection with Carnap’s method of explication. But I 
am unconvinced by Shepherd and Justus’ specific proposal: as I argue in §3, there are reasons to doubt 
that the proposal brings any genuine benefits to the method of explication. A more promising proposal 
affords experimental philosophy a role at a more important stage of explication, aiding the construction 
                                                     
1 Schupbach (forthcoming) argues that experimental philosophy can be incorporated into ‘Oppenheimian explication’, a 
method for illuminating concepts. Nothing herein bears upon Schupbach’s project.  
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of fruitful concepts. I sketch the proposal in §4. If right, experimental philosophy can play an active role 
in the development of theoretical conceptual frameworks, directly affecting the shape of future scientific 
inquiry. 
The upshot is that experimental philosophy may count, in one good sense, as applied 
philosophy. It is a genuinely practical concern how theorists should engineer their concepts for the 
purposes of theorising, and the method of explication addresses that practical concern directly, by 
providing an implementable procedure for undertaking one key aspect of theoretical practice. In this 
sense, it is natural to think of the method of explication as one aspect of applied philosophy. And thus, 
insofar as experimental philosophy plays an important role within that method, it too can be construed 
as applied philosophy.  
2. Carnapian explication 
Explication, as introduced by Carnap, is a method for replacing terms and concepts with more precise 
counterparts, in order to facilitate theorising.2 The imprecise term or concept with which we start, called 
the explicandum, may “belong to everyday language or to a previous stage in the development of 
scientific language” (Carnap 1950: 3). The precise replacement is called the explicatum. 
 The method begins with an informal clarification of the explicandum (Carnap 1950: 4–5; 1963: 
933). Anticipating Shepherd and Justus’ terminology, I call this stage explication preparation. Such 
clarification is a “means for reaching a relatively good mutual understanding as to [the explicandum’s] 
intended meaning” and “serves only to make clear what is meant as the explicandum” (1950:  4). The 
clarification is achieved with informal examples that illustrate how the explicandum is, and is not, to be 
understood. For example, prior to an explication of SALT, Carnap suggests that one might say: “I mean 
by the explicandum ‘salt’, not its wide sense which it has in chemistry but its narrow sense in which it 
is used in the household language” (1950: 4–5). One might go on to provide the explicatum NACL. 
                                                     
2 I will sometimes talk of concepts and at other times talk of terms. In each case, I suppose that an explicandum qua term 
expresses the explicandum qua concept; and that the explicatum qua term expresses the explicatum qua concept. Throughout, 
I use small capitals to denote concepts. 
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After explication preparation, the theorist should provide the explicatum itself. Carnap provides 
four requirements that the explicatum should satisfy “to a sufficient degree” (1950: 7). First, the 
explicatum should be similar in relevant respects to the explicandum: we should be able to deploy the 
explicatum in most situations in which we would previously have deployed the explicandum. Second, 
the explicatum should be precise (or exact): exact rules for its use should be given. Third, the explicatum 
should be fruitful: it should feature in relevant laws and generalisations. And, fourth, the explicatum 
should be simple. 
Carnap gives the following example (1950: 12–15). The explicandum is WARMER, understood 
to depend solely on our sensations, and the explicatum is TEMPERATURE, understood as a quantitative 
concept. The four requirements are satisfied as follows. First, similarity: in most cases in which x is 
(according to our sensations) warmer than y, the temperature of x is greater than the temperature of y. 
Second, precision: rules for the use of TEMPERATURE can be given with reference to thermometers. 
Third, fruitfulness: TEMPERATURE features in (for example) the ideal gas laws. And, fourth, simplicity: 
both the rules for the use of TEMPERATURE, and the laws in which it features, are simple. In light of 
such considerations, Carnap takes TEMPERATURE to be “the [explicatum of WARMER] important for 
science” (1950: 14).  
A few comments about the four requirements are in order. First, as noted above, they need only 
be satisfied to a sufficient degree. With respect to similarity, Carnap writes that “close similarity is not 
required, and considerable differences are permitted” (1950: 7). With respect to precision, it is sufficient 
that the explicatum be more precise than the explicandum. Thus, in Meaning and Necessity, Carnap 
describes the method of explication as “[the] task of making more exact a vague or not quite exact 
concept […], or rather of replacing it by a newly constructed, more exact concept” (1947: 7–8, my 
emphasis). Fruitfulness, of which I will say more presently, is likewise a matter of degree. And, with 
regard to simplicity, Carnap explicitly subordinates the requirement to the others; the explicatum should 
be “as simple as the more important requirements permit” (1950: 7).  
Second, most commentators, including Shepherd and Justus, take fruitfulness to be the most 
fundamental requirement. Thus, Shepherd and Justus write that “precision for precision’s sake is not 
the agenda”, rather “enhancing precision usually enhances fruitfulness, which is the agenda” (2015: 
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388). Similarly, Schupbach writes that “Carnap plays favorites with regards to his desiderata, 
prioritizing fruitfulness over similarity” (forthcoming: 7) and Dutilh Novaes and Reck write that 
“fruitfulness is ultimately the most significant requirement for an explication overall” (forthcoming: 
§1.3). The spirit of prioritising fruitfulness is captured in Kitcher’s discussion of explication, in which 
he writes that “[t]here’s no higher standard to which our concepts are to answer than the efficient 
satisfaction of the purposes of inquiry” (2008: 119). And, certainly, insofar as an explicator is 
principally motivated by theoretical inquiry, it is natural to suppose that the fruitfulness of the 
explicatum will be her principal aim.  
Third, I follow commentators in taking fruitfulness to be broader than as explicitly 
characterised by Carnap. The latter takes an explicatum to be fruitful to the extent that it features in 
relevant laws and generalisations. However, Dutilh Novaes and Reck write that 
there must be more to fruitfulness than the formulation or derivation of universal statements. 
[…] Carnap’s view seems to be that an explication is useful or fruitful when it delivers ‘results’ 
that could not be delivered otherwise (or with much more difficulty), i.e. with the explicandum 
alone. […] The goal is to produce new knowledge about the phenomena to which the 
explicandum pertains. (Forthcoming: §1.5). 
Both Kitcher and Shepherd and Justus develop more localised accounts of fruitfulness. Kitcher takes 
Carnap’s account to be “deeply problematic for the biological, earth and human sciences” (2008: 115). 
He suggests instead that  
we conceive of the aims of the sciences in terms of the provision of answers to significant 
questions, where the sources of significance are various, sometimes practical, sometimes in 
terms of the satisfaction of disinterested curiosity. (2008: 115) 
And Shepherd and Justus claim that Carnap’s account of fruitfulness is not appropriate for epistemic 
concepts. They suggest that one way that an explicatum for an epistemic concept might be fruitful is by 
improving our ability to reason: “explications of epistemic concepts should consider how they might 
cohere with and ideally improve the statistical methods that deliver well-supported beliefs in the 
sciences” (2015: 398).  
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As these quotations indicate, what constitutes fruitfulness is to a certain extent up for grabs. I 
will make use of this flexibility in §4. For now, however, I simply note that there may be a variety of 
general and perhaps subject-specific ways in which a concept may be fruitful. Whatever the details, 
fruitfulness is likely to be broader than merely featuring in laws and generalisations.  
 Once explication preparation has been completed and a suitable explicatum highlighted, then 
the final stage of explication is to replace the explicandum with the explicatum. The idea is not to 
replace the explicandum in every possible context. For example, we need not replace explicanda with 
explicata in ordinary conversational contexts: we do not need to start asking for “NaCl” or “sodium 
chloride” across the dinner table. Rather, the idea is that, in the relevant theoretical contexts, the 
theorists in question are to use the explicatum in place of the explicandum: chemists (qua chemist) 
should use NACL when they might otherwise have used SALT; physicists (qua physicist) should use 
TEMPERATURE when they might otherwise have used WARMER; and so on. 
 Before proceeding, note that various philosophical objections have been raised against the 
method of explication; in particular, Strawson (1963) objected that explication involves a problematic 
‘change of subject’. As much has already been written in defence of the method I will not respond to 
such objections here.3 On the assumption that explication is defensible, I will consider whether 
experimental philosophy has an important role within that methodology.   
3. Experimental explication preparation 
Shepherd and Justus (2015) claim that experimental philosophy should be used to clarify explicanda 
during explication preparation, in a process they call experimental explication preparation. The idea is 
that experimental philosophy provides objective methods for clarifying concepts, and thus is well-suited 
to this preliminary stage of explication.  
By way of motivation, they highlight a particular challenge facing any Carnapian explicator: 
“pinpoint[ing] the content that merits attempted preservation [in the explicatum] and the content that 
                                                     
3 See e.g.: Brun forthcoming; Carnap 1963; Carus 2007; Dutilh Novaes and Reck forthcoming; Justus 2012; Kitcher 2008; 
Maher 2007; Schupbach forthcoming. 
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should be abandoned” (p. 389). The challenge arises as follows. On the one hand, “being tethered to 
imprecise explicanda appears to hinder, not advance, the development of fruitful explicata.” (ibid). In 
part, this is because explicanda are “problematically vague […] amorphous and imprecise” (p. 388), 
and “many [candidate explicanda] possess content and encourage implications that would mislead 
rather than guide explication” (p. 389). Yet, on the other hand, “radical revisionism overlooks how folk 
concepts often describe features of the world and guide in theorizing about them, albeit rudimentarily” 
(ibid). So, for Shepherd and Justus, the challenge for the explicator is to preserve those aspects of the 
intuitive content of our concepts that will facilitate future theorising, while discarding the problematic, 
misleading aspects of those concepts. 
They introduce experimental explication preparation to help overcome the challenge. 
To pinpoint the content that merits attempted preservation and the content that should be 
abandoned […], a method for vetting explicanda is needed. […] With its insistence on using 
scientific methods to analyse empirical sources of information about concepts […], x-phi has 
an especially important role to play in explication preparation […]. Explicandum clarification, 
for example, is best achieved through empirically rigorous studies of the kind experimental 
philosophers conduct […]. (2015: 389–390) 
Experimental philosophy, then, can play a role in explication preparation. In particular, experimental 
studies can clarify the explicandum: they can “uncover regions of vagueness in extensions and 
intensions of concepts”, “reveal instances of conceptual pluralism”, “discover sources of bias”, 
“discover unpredictable (even if non-biasing) influences on conceptual judgments”, and “outline a 
concept’s central features” (p. 390).4 Having explicitly mapped out such features of the relevant 
                                                     
4 It is unclear whether Shepherd and Justus intend survey participants to be folk, theorists or a mixture thereof. Their challenge 
to the explicator is framed in terms of folk concepts (see e.g. their brief comment about ‘radical revisionism’, quoted above), 
suggesting that only folk need be participants. But Shepherd and Justus are also explicitly aware that explicanda can be drawn 
from an earlier stage of theorising (2015: 388), and folk intuitions would presumably be irrelevant in such cases. Regardless, 
nothing in what follows turns on how Shepherd and Justus spell the details out here. 
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explicandum, the explicator will be better placed to perform “the explicative evaluation of [its] 
conceptual content” (p. 382)—and thus better placed to pinpoint the content that deserves preservation. 
Shepherd and Justus take themselves to have shown that experimental philosophy “has an 
important function within explication” (p. 400). However, pace Shepherd and Justus, it is far from clear 
that this is so.  There are at least three reasons: first, it is unclear that there is any reason to deviate from 
Carnap’s non-experimental construal of explication preparation; second, Shepherd and Justus have not 
provided us with a mechanism by which experimentation might have a genuine effect upon explications; 
and third, there are reasons to think that any such effect would be minimal anyhow. 
First, there is no obvious reason why we should want to deviate from Carnap’s non-
experimental construal of explication preparation in the first place. As noted above, Shepherd and Justus 
motivate such deviation by suggesting that some explicanda can be vague, amorphous and imprecise, 
and can contain content that is liable to mislead the explicative process. However, explication 
preparation, as conceived by Carnap, is already sufficient to overcome such deficiencies in the 
explicandum. For Carnap, explication preparation serves to make clear the sense in which the 
explicandum is to be explicated by pointing towards how the explicandum is, and is not, intended to be 
understood. Recall his preparation of the explicandum SALT, quoted above; he achieves clarification 
perfectly well with a single sentence, despite the fact that the ordinary term “salt” is ambiguous. It is 
unclear what an empirical study of the concept SALT would have added to the situation. 
Consider a less mundane example, such as Haslanger’s project to explicate GENDER (2000). 
(Haslanger does not explicitly use the term “explication”. But, if we allow fruitfulness to incorporate 
political and social ends, as do Carus (2007) and Dutilh Novaes and Reck (forthcoming), then 
Haslanger’s project is clearly an example of explication.) While mentioning a variety of different uses 
of “gender” in the literature, Haslanger prepares the explication by writing the following: 
The guiding idea is sometimes expressed with the slogan: “gender is the social meaning of sex”.  
[…] My strategy is to offer a focal analysis that defines gender, in the primary sense, as a social 
class. A focal analysis undertakes to explain a variety of connected phenomena in terms of their 
relations to one that is theorized as the central or core phenomenon. As I see it, the core 
phenomenon to be addressed is the pattern of social relations that constitute the social classes 
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of men as dominant and women as subordinate; norms, symbols, and identities are gendered in 
relation to the social relations that constitute gender. (Haslanger 2000: 37) 
Now, this explication preparation is sufficient for the purposes of ‘making clear what is meant as the 
explicandum’: Haslanger intends to define GENDER in the sense in which it is taken to be the social 
meaning of sex, and in which it is tied explicitly to a particular pattern of social relations. No further 
information is required to get an initial handle on Haslanger’s intended explicandum. In particular, for 
the purposes at hand, we do not appear to need any experimental evidence about folks’ (or feminists’ 
or social scientists’) conceptions of GENDER.5 Haslanger’s simple statement of what she has in mind is 
enough. And yet the folk concept GENDER is arguably vague and imprecise (there are borderline cases 
of MAN and WOMAN), amorphous (it is sometimes used interchangeably with SEX), and liable to mislead 
(due to the pretheoretic exclusivity and exhaustiveness of the MAN/WOMAN distinction). If this is right, 
then there is no obvious reason to deviate from Carnap’s construal of explication preparation: non-
experimental explication preparation serves its purpose. 
The second concern about Shepherd and Justus’ proposal is this: they have provided no 
mechanism by which experimentation can affect the explicative process in any meaningful way. Their 
proposal is that the explicator should experimentally clarify the explicandum before embarking on the 
explicative process. But there is no obvious reason to think that such clarification will benefit the 
explicative procedure.  
Ultimately, it is up to Shepherd and Justus to provide the relevant details. But here are two 
possible mechanisms that they might have in mind. The first mechanism is this: by making the 
explicator aware of any vagueness, pluralism, bias, etc., associated with the explicandum, experimental 
explication preparation may highlight potential pitfalls facing her attempt to construct a precise 
explicatum. However, such a mechanism would seemingly render experimental explication preparation 
of minimal value. For any serious explication, vagueness, pluralism, bias, etc., are not the relevant 
pitfalls (and, indeed, can be overcome by non-experimental explication preparation). A serious 
explicator has prior knowledge of the field for which she is constructing the explicatum, and will be 
                                                     
5 Of course, if the project were to clarify their conceptions of GENDER, then empirical evidence would presumably be required. 
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able to situate her intended understanding of the explicandum accordingly (as Haslanger does, above). 
The principal pitfalls facing the explication will typically be theoretical, and are most likely to come to 
light through a thorough understanding of the theoretical terrain.  
For example, following the above quotation, Haslanger goes on to sketch two theoretical 
problems facing any attempt to explicate the concept GENDER: “the commonality problem questions 
whether there is anything social that females have in common that could count as their ‘gender’ […]. 
The normativity problem raises the concern that any definition of ‘what woman is’ is value-laden, and 
will marginalize certain females […]” (2000: 37). The precise nature of these problems is not of concern 
here. The point is that those are the serious pitfalls that Haslanger faced; and it took knowledge of the 
theoretical terrain, rather than experimental studies, to draw them out. I see little reason to doubt that a 
parallel point would apply in other cases of explication. 
A second mechanism that Shepherd and Justus might have in mind is this: by giving the 
explicator a clear idea of the intuitive content associated with her explicandum, experimental 
explication preparation allows her to more readily evaluate that intuitive content with respect to the four 
requirements (similarity, precision, fruitfulness and simplicity). Such a suggestion, however, appears in 
tension with the method of explication: explication does not involve the evaluation of the intuitive 
content of an explicandum to determine which aspects of that content should be kept and which aspects 
discarded. Rather, explication involves the construction of an explicatum designed to play a theoretical 
role, and an evaluation of the content of the explicatum. The explicator only ever considers the extent 
to which the explicatum satisfies the four requirements: at no stage does she evaluate the intuitive 
content of the explicandum.  
 One way or another, Shepherd and Justus must provide a mechanism by which, on their 
proposal, experimentation affects explication—whether by defusing the above comments or proposing 
an alternative mechanism. Without a plausible mechanism, there is little reason to accept that 
experimental explication preparation can have an important role within explication. 
Finally, even if Shepherd and Justus can fill in the details, there is nonetheless reason to expect 
that, on their proposal, the effect of experimentation would be minimal. The heavy lifting within any 
explication is done by the construction of a fruitful explicatum. That is the step within an explication 
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that facilitates future theorising. But, experimental explication preparation does not contribute to it 
directly. Experimental explication preparation serves to map out any vagueness, pluralism, bias, etc., in 
the explicandum. Yet such maps do not obviously indicate how to construct fruitful explicata. As noted 
above, the explicator does not begin with a full description of an explicandum in order to isolate the 
content that will prove theoretically useful; rather, she begins with a theoretical need and, to satisfy that 
need, she seeks to construct a theoretical concept that resembles the explicandum in certain respects.6  
Consider, for example, a recent example: the concept PLANET.7 Until recently, there was no 
agreed upon definition—merely nine canonical instances. However, in the late twentieth century, a 
number of objects orbiting the sun, comparable in size to Pluto, were discovered in the Kuiper belt. 
Following such discoveries, in 2006, the International Astronomical Union explicated PLANET in order 
to provide a more principled taxonomy of celestial objects. A planet was henceforth to be an object 
such that: (a) it orbited a star but did not orbit another planet; (b) it was large enough for gravity to have 
formed it into a sphere but not large enough for its gravity to trigger fusion; and (c) it had cleared its 
orbit of debris. Pluto, and the objects discovered in the Kuiper belt, were demoted to the status of dwarf-
planet. 
What is important here is that the explication was driven by the theoretical need for a principled 
taxonomy of celestial objects. To find such a taxonomy, it was necessary to consider the properties of 
the celestial objects in question, rather than folk or scientists’ intuitions about what falls under their 
prior concept PLANET. As professor of astronomy Michael A’Hearn puts it: 
Why do we, as scientists, care how Pluto (or anything else) is classified? […] Scientists put 
things into groups, the members of which share common properties, in order to find patterns 
that will enable us to better understand how the bodies work or how they became what they are. 
[…] [I]t is clear that Pluto is not a planet like Jupiter but is rather a planet like the numerous 
                                                     
6 The situation here is complicated by the positive view I develop in §4. Nonetheless, the point will remain: experimental 
explication preparation per se will not lead to more fruitful explicata than Carnap’s non-experimental explication preparation.  
7 See e.g. Tyson 2009, Weintraub 2007. 
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Plutinos that live in the 3-2 libration with Neptune. Thus Pluto should be classified as the largest 
Plutino. (Quoted in Weintraub 2007: 229) 
From the explicator’s perspective, the important step in the explication of PLANET was to ascertain the 
common properties that would facilitate future theorising: once these properties are highlighted, the 
definition (a)–(c) could be constructed.8 This is the important work in explication and, on Shepherd and 
Justus’s proposal, experimentation appears to be irrelevant to it.  
  There are concerns, then, with Shepherd and Justus’ specific proposal. I do not take these 
comments to be decisive but, until Shepherd and Justus provide more details, I will remain sceptical 
about the prospects of experimental explication preparation. In the next section, I sketch an alternative 
proposal.  
4. Fruitfulness, Uptake and Experimentation 
Consider the following characterisation, due to Kitcher, of the attempt to explicate the concept FITNESS 
in philosophy of biology. 
Practicing evolutionary biologists know how to measure fitness. They do so by counting 
offspring. […] [V]irtually all philosophical concern with the notion of fitness starts from the 
idea that any identification of fitness with actual reproductive success must be resisted. The 
philosophical problem of fitness that has dominated discussions in recent decades has been to 
find some useful surrogate for the measure that field biologists seem to be using. One noted 
proposal has been the so-called propensity interpretation of fitness; a rival has been to suggest 
that ‘fitness’ ought to be treated as a theoretical term, whose meaning is partially specified by 
the correspondence rules of Darwinian evolutionary theory. […]. For the most part, biologists 
have ignored the arcana of philosophical accounts of fitness. (Kitcher 2008: 120–122) 
                                                     
8 On the view I develop in §4, the fruitfulness of the explicatum depends in part on uptake by relevant theorists: so, facilitating 
future astronomical theorising involved, in part, providing an explicatum that astronomers would indeed use.   
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According to Kitcher, philosophers have been caught up with the idea that scientific theories and 
explanations are to be understood in terms of scientific laws. From such a perspective, the theory of 
evolution appears to be governed by a principle “to the effect that traits of relatively greater fitness will 
become more prevalent in a population” (2008: 120); but any such principle is trivialised if, following 
evolutionary biologists, fitness is defined in terms of actual reproductive success. Kitcher, however, 
suggests that the underlying view of scientific theories and explanations is inappropriate in this case: 
“[t]he practice of evolutionary biology […] couples detailed mathematical accounts with empirical data 
about the causes of some component of fitness […], and there is no need to invoke any grand principle 
of natural selection” (p. 121). The philosophers’ explication, then, is of little value to actual practice in 
evolutionary biology. 
 Accepting Kitcher’s characterisation of the situation for the sake of argument, it is tempting to 
conclude that the philosophers’ explicata for FITNESS have not been particularly fruitful. Regardless of 
whether the explicata could be used to formulate a ‘grand principle of natural selection’, or whether 
they could facilitate the generation of new knowledge or provide answers to significant questions, the 
philosophers’ explicata have not influenced scientific practice. This is suggestive of the following: 
uptake can be a contributing factor to the overall fruitfulness of an explicatum. That is, one explicatum 
might be more fruitful than another if, all else being equal, the former but not the latter is adopted by 
the relevant theoretical community as a replacement for the explicandum in question. 
 For the remainder of this paper, I seek to pursue this line of thought. I sketch the conception of 
fruitfulness I have in mind, before explaining how it affords experimental philosophy a genuine role in 
the method of explication. 
 First, fruitfulness. We saw in §2 that different theorists understand fruitfulness in different 
ways. For Carnap, a concept is fruitful insofar as it features in relevant laws and generalisations; for 
Dutilh Novaes and Reck, insofar as it produces new knowledge; for Kitcher, a concept of biological, 
earth and human sciences is fruitful insofar as it facilitates the provision of answers to significant 
questions; and for Shepherd and Justus, an epistemic concept may be fruitful by its improving our 
reasoning ability. Now, these different ways of understanding fruitfulness are not in conflict, and we 
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should not try to decide between them. Rather, these theorists have highlighted a cluster of criteria, such 
that different concepts may be fruitful by satisfying different criteria.  
 Three points are worth noting. Firstly, it is unlikely that each discipline will have its own, well-
defined cluster of criteria. Consider again Kitcher’s suggestion that fruitfulness for biological, earth and 
human scientific concepts be understood in terms of the provision of answers to significant questions. 
If Kitcher is right about this, then, nonetheless, his criterion might also be appropriate in other 
disciplines: perhaps, say, the concept of STRING in string theory is fruitful in part in virtue of its 
providing an answer to the question “What is the world made up of?”. And, conversely, other criteria 
might nonetheless sometimes be appropriate in the biological, earth and human sciences: perhaps, say, 
the evolutionary biological concept RELATIONSHIP CO-EFFICIENT is fruitful in virtue of its featuring in 
a law, namely Hamilton’s Rule. Of course, it may be true that some criterion is particularly well suited 
to some specific discipline(s)—indeed, I take that to be what Kitcher has in mind, and I have no 
objection to him so understood—but, regardless, we should not identify some given criteria of 
fruitfulness as being definitively for a specific discipline. 
 Secondly, the cluster of criteria might turn out to be open-ended. That is, we may be unable to 
give a list of criteria such that, for any given concept, it can only be fruitful by satisfying some of those 
criteria. (This is why I call it a ‘cluster’ rather than a ‘set’.) Criteria for fruitfulness are, at least to some 
extent, dependent on the specific aims that a concept engineer may have, and the specific context in 
which a concept is explicated may suggest its own criteria for fruitfulness. At the very least, it is a viable 
enterprise to suggest new criteria that hitherto have not been recognised as belonging to the cluster. 
 Thirdly, the thought is not that there is some algorithm for determining the overall fruitfulness 
of a concept by looking at the extent to which it satisfies the various criteria. Rather: a given criterion 
will only be relevant in some theoretical contexts (e.g. if Kitcher is right, then featuring-in-laws is 
largely irrelevant in the context of evolutionary biological explanations involving fitness); it may not 
be obvious in advance which criteria will be relevant (e.g. if Kitcher is right, then philosophers 
mistakenly thought that featuring-in-laws was typically relevant in the context of evolutionary 
biological explanations involving fitness); and there may not be any rationally preferred way to weight 
their relative importance (e.g. different theorists may come to different judgements about which of two 
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concepts is the more fruitful, without either being in error). This is not to say that ‘anything goes’. There 
may simply be context-sensitive and subjective elements to determining fruitfulness.   
I suggest we think of uptake as a criterion for fruitfulness: being adopted by the relevant 
theoretical community in place of the relevant explicandum may sometimes contribute to the overall 
fruitfulness of the explicatum. There are two points to make about this. 
Firstly, there are at least two possible understandings of the criterion. On one understanding, 
an explicatum might satisfy the criterion by its in fact being adopted by the relevant theoretical 
community; then, for example, the explicatum might become more fruitful over time by its being 
deployed more widely. On the other understanding, an explicatum might satisfy the criterion by its 
being likely to be adopted by the relevant theoretical community; then, for example, an explicatum that 
is highly fruitful in part by satisfying this criterion might by historical accident happen not to be adopted 
by the relevant theoretical community.9 It is unclear to me which option (if either) is to be preferred. 
The former is far the simpler; but, if we want the actual fruitfulness of candidate explicata to be a factor 
during the explicative process, then the latter is perhaps preferable. Regardless, nothing essential herein 
turns on the choice, and so I remain neutral in what follows. 
 Secondly, who the relevant theoretical community is will depend on the intended purpose of a 
given explication. Recall the philosophers’ explications of FITNESS. I suggested above that, accepting 
that evolutionary biologists have ignored those explications, it is natural to say that the explicata are not 
fruitful. However, this is fair only insofar as the philosophers in question intended their explications to 
be relevant to the biologists; if the intention had been, say, merely to provide a rational reconstruction 
of evolutionary biology, then the evolutionary biologists’ ambivalence towards the explicata would 
plausibly have been irrelevant to the philosophers’ aims. In the former case, then, the relevant 
theoretical community is the community of evolutionary biologists; but in the latter case, it would rather 
be the community of philosophers of evolutionary biology. One must look to the intentions of the 
explicator to determine who the relevant theoretical community is. 
                                                     
9 Incidentally, the distinction here parallels that between understanding fitness in terms of actual number of offspring, and 
understanding it in terms of propensities. 
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 Let me summarise. I have sketched an account of fruitfulness on which various different criteria 
can contribute to the overall fruitfulness of the explicatum, where the relevant criteria cannot be 
determined without reference to the specific theoretical context in which the explication is performed. 
I have suggested that we consider uptake to be one such criterion: some explicata can be fruitful in part 
by being adopted by the relevant theoretical community. 
 It should be immediately clear that, construing fruitfulness in this way, experimentation could 
play an important role in the construction of fruitful explicata. The reason is that determining the 
conditions under which various communities adopt a given explicatum is an empirical matter. To 
understand the social, political, psychological, theoretical and other factors that contribute to whether 
an explicatum is adopted, we will likely require a significant amount of data. In particular, in order to 
distinguish the factors in play, given the complexity of the case, we will likely require the kind of data 
that can only be obtained by manipulating just one factor at a time—which is just to say that we would 
need experimental data. With such data to hand, we could begin to understand how to construct 
explicata that are more likely to be adopted by the relevant theoretical communities; and this 
understanding could then be applied in practice in the construction of fruitful explicata. In cases where 
the uptake criterion applied, experimentation would then genuinely aid the explicative procedure. 
Such experimental data, however, are not of the sort typically generated by contemporary 
experimental philosophy. Rather, they would presumably be generated (if at all) by social and political 
science and experimental psychology. Nonetheless, it is likely that experimental philosophy would have 
an important role in the present picture. The reason is this: one factor that is likely to be relevant to 
whether an explicatum is adopted by a community is how well the individuals in that community take 
the explicatum to capture the central features of the explicandum, and how well they take it to capture 
the explicandum’s key connections to other concepts. If most theorists within a given community think 
that the explicatum fails to capture the central features of the explicandum, and fails to preserve its key 
connections to other concepts, then the community will likely reject the explication—that is, the 
explicatum will likely not be adopted in place of the explicandum.  
(This explains, for example, why it is typically so difficult to explicate a concept uniformly 
across a variety of disciplines. Consider the concept SPECIES: evolutionary biologists may seek a 
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taxonomy aligned with evolutionary history; veterinary scientists may seek a taxonomy aligned with 
physiology; bacteriologists may seek a taxonomy aligned with the interests of (human) medicine; and 
so on. In each case, at least one community of theorists is likely to reject any given explication of 
SPECIES because the explicatum fails to capture some feature of the explicandum that theorists in that 
community take to be central.) 
If this is right, then experimental philosophy can have a role to play in the construction of 
fruitful explicata: in the relevant cases, an individual construction of an explicatum will be more fruitful 
if it is (more likely to be) adopted by the relevant theoretical community; and the explicatum will be 
more likely to be adopted if the explicator pays close attention to what the theorists in that community 
take the central features and key conceptual connections of the explicandum to be; and one task to which 
experimental philosophy is suited is to uncovering what various groups of people take the central 
features and key conceptual connections of a concept to be. Indeed, on the latter point, Shepherd and 
Justus are in agreement, writing that the 
empirically rigorous studies of the kind experimental philosophers conduct [can] outline a 
concept’s features and its dependence relations with other concepts. Work on ‘innateness’ 
reveals its central features and indicates the problematic relationships between them (Griffiths 
et al. 2009). And work on ‘free will’ has uncovered connections between ‘consciousness’ and 
capacities for agential behaviour (Shepherd 2012). (Shepherd and Justus 2015: 390–391).   
To expand briefly on one example, Griffiths et al. provide evidence that there are three central features 
that are particularly associated with folk judgements of whether or not a particular trait is innate in a 
certain kind of organism: Fixity, the trait being generally hard to change once acquired by an organism 
of that kind; Typicality, the trait being common to organisms of that kind; and Teleology, the trait being 
something that organisms of that kind are supposed to develop or possess (2009: 609). The evidence 
was obtained by asking participants the strength of the agreement with statements such as “trait x is 
innate”, for the eight possible sets of features possessed by the trait (i.e. either Fixed or not, and either 
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Typical or not, and either Teleological or not). The results suggested that Fixity and Typicality are 
closely associated with folk judgements of innateness, and Teleology less so.10  
Although such studies focus on folk, the general point carries across to theorists: experimental 
philosophy can play a role in determining the central features and key conceptual connections of 
concepts as understood by relevant theoretical communities. The upshot is that experimental 
philosophy has a potentially important role to play in Carnapian explication.  
The proposal, then, is this. Suppose that one seeks to explicate concept C and that one intends 
the explication to be adopted by theoretical community T. Then, to satisfy the fruitfulness requirement, 
one should seek to satisfy the uptake criterion (perhaps amongst other criteria). To satisfy the uptake 
criterion, one should seek to maximise the likelihood that T will adopt the explicatum in place of C. One 
partial strategy for achieving this likely involves ensuring that the explicatum captures what the 
members of T take the central features and key conceptual connections of C to be. But, to follow this 
strategy, one must know what the members of T take the central features and key conceptual connections 
of C to be. Such knowledge can be obtained via the kinds of experiments performed by experimental 
philosophers. Thus, one is best placed to construct a highly fruitful explicatum for C if one takes into 
account experimentally obtained data about what the members of T take the central features and key 
conceptual connections of C to be. 
It is worth noting briefly that this proposal avoids concerns parallel to those I raised in §3. First, 
there is reason to deviate from Carnap’s conception of fruitfulness: as noted by commentators, his 
conception is too narrow given the variation between different theoretical disciplines. Second, I have 
provided a mechanism by which experimentation can have a genuine effect upon explications: 
explicators are to use experimental data to help guide the construction of explicata. In particular, the 
explicata are to capture what members of the theoretical community take the central features and 
conceptual connections of the explicandum to be. And, third, on this proposal, experimental philosophy 
contributes to the heavy-lifting within an explication: as a result of experimentation along the lines I 
have suggested, we would expect explicators to construct explicata that are more fruitful than would 
                                                     
10 See Griffiths et al. 2009 for details. 
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otherwise have been constructed. Insofar as fruitfulness is the principal requirement upon explicata, this 
is an important result. 
If this is on the right lines, then there is clear positive work for experimental philosophy to 
undertake in connection with Carnap’s method of explication. I have cast doubt on the specifics of 
Shepherd and Justus’ proposal to introduce an experimental element to explication preparation, 
suggesting instead that experimental philosophy can play a role in the construction of fruitful concepts. 
This provides a clear practical role for experimental philosophy, both within the sciences and theoretical 
inquiry more generally. In this respect, experimental philosophy may rightly be construed as applied 
philosophy. 
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